

**PECO ENERGY COMPANY
STATEMENT NO. 5**

BEFORE THE
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
v.
PECO ENERGY COMPANY – ELECTRIC DIVISION

DOCKET NO. R-2021-3024601

DIRECT TESTIMONY

WITNESS: PAUL R. MOUL

SUBJECT: OVERALL RATE OF RETURN,
INCLUDING CAPITAL STRUCTURE
RATIOS, EMBEDDED COST OF DEBT
AND THE COST OF EQUITY, FOR
PECO ENERGY COMPANY –
ELECTRIC DIVISION

DATED: MARCH 30, 2021

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND DEFINED TERMS	
ACRONYM	DEFINED TERM
AFUDC	Allowance for Funds Used During Construction
β	Beta
b	Represents the retention rate that consists of the fraction of earnings that are not paid out as dividends
b x r	Represents internal growth
CAPM	Capital Asset Pricing Model
CCR	Corporate Credit Rating
CE	Comparable Earnings Approach
Commission	Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
Company	PECO Energy Company
CWIP	Construction Work in Progress
DCF	Discounted Cash Flow
FOMC	Federal Open Market Committee
g	Growth rate
IGF	Internally Generated Funds
LDC	Local Distribution Company
Lev	Leverage modification
LT	Long Term
M&M	Modigliani & Miller
OCI	Other Comprehensive Income
PECO	PECO Energy Company
PUHCA	Public Utility Holding Company Act
r	Represents the expected rate of return on common equity
Rf	Risk-free rate of return
Rm	Market risk premium
RP	Risk Premium
s	Represents the new common shares expected to be issued by a firm
s x v	Represents external growth

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND DEFINED TERMS	
ACRONYM	DEFINED TERM
S&P	Standard & Poor's
v	Represents the value that accrues to existing shareholders from selling stock at a price different from book value
ytm	Yield to maturity

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**DIRECT TESTIMONY
OF
PAUL R. MOUL**

4 **I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

5 **1. Q. Please state your name, occupation and business address.**

6 A. My name is Paul Ronald Moul. My business address is 251 Hopkins Road,
7 Haddonfield, New Jersey 08033-3062. I am Managing Consultant at the firm P.
8 Moul & Associates, an independent financial and regulatory consulting firm. My
9 educational background, business experience and qualifications are provided in
10 Appendix A, which follows my direct testimony.

11 **2. Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony?**

12 A. My testimony presents evidence, analysis, and a recommendation concerning the
13 appropriate cost of common equity and overall rate of return that the Pennsylvania
14 Public Utility Commission (“Commission”) should recognize in determining the
15 revenues that PECO Energy Company’s (“PECO” or the “Company”) Electric
16 Division will be authorized to realize at the conclusion of this proceeding. My
17 analysis and recommendation are supported by the detailed financial data
18 contained in PECO Exhibit PRM-1, which is a multi-page document divided into
19 fourteen (14) schedules. My testimony is based upon my first-hand knowledge of
20 PECO, consisting of information obtained from meetings with the Company's
21 management and Company-specific data that is widely disseminated within the
22 financial community.

1 **3. Q. Based upon your analysis, what is your conclusion concerning the**
2 **appropriate rate of return for the Company in this case?**

3 A. My conclusion is that the Company should be afforded an opportunity to earn a
4 rate of return on common equity of 10.95%. The 10.95% rate of return on
5 common equity is composed of a 10.70% cost of equity determined from the
6 results of my proxy group analysis and 0.25% in recognition of the exemplary
7 performance of the Company’s management. My analysis of the Company and
8 its superior performance is based upon the direct testimony of Mr. John E.
9 McDonald, the Company’s Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer,
10 and the direct testimony of other Company witnesses.

11 As shown on Schedule 1, I have calculated a 7.68% overall cost of capital for the
12 Company estimated at December 31, 2022. This return, which is the product of
13 weighting the individual capital costs by the proportion of each respective type of
14 capital, should establish a compensatory level of return for the use of capital and
15 provide the Company with the ability to attract capital on reasonable terms.

16 **4. Q. Are there unusual factors that you included in your analysis of the cost of**
17 **equity for PECO that make this case unique?**

18 A. Yes. My cost of equity analysis reflects the impact of the coronavirus pandemic
19 and the collapse of crude oil prices that occurred in the first quarter of 2020.
20 These events have had a significant impact on the capital markets – both debt and
21 equity. Extraordinary events around the COVID-19 pandemic have produced
22 significant turmoil that has rocked the stock and bond markets beginning in the

1 February-March 2020 time frame. During this period, we saw abrupt reaction to
2 the coronavirus pandemic and declines in the price of crude oil. These events led
3 to the end of the record-setting 128-month economic expansion. As we entered a
4 recession in February 2020, extraordinary actions were taken by the Federal Open
5 Market Committee (“FOMC”) to address these disruptions. How these events are
6 fully resolved is yet to be determined.

7 I have considered these events as they impact the inputs that I used in the various
8 models of the cost of equity. I have analyzed the cost of equity models using
9 input data that follows the onset of the economic recession.

10 **5. Q. What background information have you considered in reaching a conclusion**
11 **concerning the Company’s cost of capital?**

12 A. The Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Exelon Corporation (“Exelon”).
13 The common stock of Exelon is traded on the Nasdaq Global Select Market.
14 Exelon is a component of the S&P 500 Composite Index. PECO provides electric
15 delivery service to more than 1,600,000 electric customers in both the City of
16 Philadelphia and the surrounding counties. Natural gas distribution service is also
17 provided to approximately 532,000 customers located in the suburban counties
18 surrounding the City of Philadelphia. PECO witness Robert J. Stefani describes
19 the percentage of residential, commercial, and industrial customers among all of
20 the customers served by PECO. Notably, with industrial customers representing
21 21% of sales, the energy needs of just 0.2% of all customers can have a
22 significant impact on the Company’s operations. Indeed, the Company’s top ten

1 customers represent 2,445 GWh, or 7% of total sales. For those distribution
2 customers who receive default service, PECO obtains the necessary energy from
3 third parties.

4 **6. Q. How have you determined the cost of common equity in this case?**

5 A. The cost of common equity is established using capital-market and financial data
6 that investors rely upon to assess the relative risk, and hence the cost of equity for
7 an electric utility. In this regard, I employed four well-recognized measures of the
8 cost of equity: (1) the Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) model; (2) the Risk
9 Premium (“RP”) analysis; (3) the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”); and (4)
10 the Comparable Earnings (“CE”) approach.

11 **7. Q. In your opinion, what factors should the Commission consider when**
12 **determining the Company’s cost of capital in this proceeding?**

13 A. The Commission’s rate of return allowance must be set to cover the Company’s
14 interest and dividend payments, provide a reasonable level of earnings retention,
15 produce an adequate level of internally generated funds to meet capital
16 requirements, be commensurate with the risk to which the Company’s capital is
17 exposed, assure confidence in the financial integrity of the Company, support
18 reasonable credit quality, and allow the Company to raise capital on reasonable
19 terms. The return that I propose fulfills these established standards of a fair rate
20 of return set forth by the landmark Bluefield and Hope cases.¹ That is to say, my

¹ *Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. P.S.C. of West Virginia*, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) and *F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

1 proposed rate of return is commensurate with returns available on investments
2 having corresponding risks.

3 **8. Q. How have you measured the cost of equity in this case?**

4 A. The models that I used to measure the cost of common equity for the Company
5 were applied with market and financial data developed for my proxy group of
6 nine (9) electric companies. The proxy group consists of electric companies that:
7 (i) have publicly-traded common stock, (ii) are contained in The Value Line
8 Investment Survey and are classified in the Electric Utility East group, (iii) are not
9 currently the target of an announced merger or acquisition, (iv) are not engaged in
10 the construction of a nuclear generating plant, and (v) have not recently reduced
11 their common dividend. The companies in the proxy group are identified on page
12 2 of Schedule 3. I will refer to these companies as the “Electric Group”
13 throughout my testimony.

14 **9. Q. How have you performed your cost of equity analysis with the market data
15 for the Electric Group?**

16 A. I have applied the models/methods for estimating the cost of equity using the
17 average data for the Electric Group. I have not measured separately the cost of
18 equity for the individual companies within the Electric Group because the
19 determination of the cost of equity for an individual company has become
20 increasingly problematic. By employing group average data, I have helped to
21 minimize the effect of extraneous influences on the market data for an individual
22 company.

1 **10. Q. Please summarize your cost of equity analysis.**

2 A. My cost of equity determination was derived from the results of the
3 methods/models identified above. In general, the use of more than one method
4 provides a superior foundation to arrive at the cost of equity. At any point in
5 time, any single method can provide an incomplete measure of the cost of equity
6 depending upon extraneous factors that may influence market sentiment. The
7 specific application of these methods/models will be described later in my
8 testimony. The following table provides a summary of the indicated costs of
9 equity using each of these approaches.

	<u>Electric Group</u>
DCF	10.66%
Risk Premium	10.00%
CAPM	11.65%
Comparable Earnings	12.60%

10 Based on the foregoing and a 25 basis point addition for superior management
11 performance, as discussed in the testimony of other PECO witnesses, I
12 recommend that the Commission allow the Company the opportunity to earn a
13 rate of return on common equity of 10.95%. While my recommendation is well
14 within the range of results shown above, there is always the potential that the
15 Company may not actually achieve its allowed rate of return due in the current
16 economic environment. Uncertainty in this regard is related to unanticipated
17 increases in operating and maintenance expenses and the impact on commercial

1 and industrial sales during this recessionary period. My recommendation should
2 be viewed as the minimum necessary to satisfy investors' expectations. It is
3 important that the Company will have a reasonable opportunity to earn its cost of
4 capital and that way, sustain its ability to attract and retain capital at the level
5 needed to support the increased demand for capital investment that I discuss in
6 more detail in Section II, below.

7 II. ELECTRIC UTILITY RISK FACTORS

8 **11. Q. Please identify some of the factors that make the electric utility industry**
9 **generally different today than it was in the past.**

10 A. Electric utilities generally are faced with a variety of challenges that affect their
11 operations, while retaining the obligation to serve under cost of service pricing
12 that continues to dominate their business risk profile.

13 PECO is part of the PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. ("PJM"). Aside from its
14 traditional responsibility to maintain reliability and comply with the mandates of
15 PJM, PECO primarily provides delivery service at regulated prices, along with its
16 responsibility for default service.

17 The risk associated with distributed generation is a major concern for the business
18 of electric delivery utilities. With technological advances in micro-turbines,
19 potential commercialization of fuel cells, development of wind and solar power,
20 the creation of micro-grids, and the requirements of the Federal Energy
21 Regulatory Commission for PJM to facilitate greater participation by distributed

1 generation in the PJM region,² utilities like PECO face the potential for bypass
2 and the resulting declines in transmission and distribution revenues. That is to
3 say, the development of distributed generation and local alternative energy has the
4 potential to displace delivery revenue that can impact the incumbent utility's
5 financial profile. This risk is exacerbated by net metering rules that require
6 offsets against distribution rates even though distribution costs may not be
7 reduced as a result of the installation of distributed generation.

8 The cost to replace aging infrastructure also adds to the risk of electric delivery
9 utilities, such as PECO, because these expenditures increase costs without any
10 concomitant increase in revenues, except through regulatory approved rate
11 increases, such as the Distribution System Improvement Charge ("DSIC"). The
12 Company continues to make substantial investments to harden its system and
13 expand its vegetation management practices to reduce the number and duration of
14 storm-related outages experienced by customers. The DSIC contains a variety of
15 limitations that will not eliminate the need for periodic rate cases to cover the
16 significant new investment that is being made by PECO. PECO has been engaged
17 in energy efficiency and conservation ("EE&C") programs mandated by Act 129
18 of 2008, P.L. 1592 ("Act 129"). Costs to the Company from demand response
19 programs such as the Company's EE&C program are recoverable only on a
20 prospective basis in future rate cases and can result in the loss of sales between
21 rate cases.

² Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators, Order No. 2222, 172 FERC ¶ 61,247 (2020).

1 **12. Q. What are the primary risk factors facing the electric delivery utilities**
2 **industry?**

3 A. A pricing structure restricted by regulation diminishes management's ability to
4 adjust its business strategy quickly to changing market conditions to respond to
5 broadening competition and the potential for bypass arising from self-generation
6 or distributed-generation. The financial structure of the electric business is
7 uncertain due to the adequacy of capital recovery, counter-party risk, potential for
8 financial penalties associated with operational problems, and growth in the
9 utilization of the transmission and distribution network by non-affiliated
10 generators and marketers. Regulatory risks include the overall framework of
11 ratesetting, cost allocation, and rate design issues, and the level of return that will
12 be allowed.

13 **13. Q. Please indicate how the Company's risk profile is affected by its construction**
14 **program.**

15 A. The Company is faced with the requirement to undertake investment to maintain
16 and upgrade existing facilities in its service territory and to meet growth. Over
17 five years, the Company's total capital expenditures, as shown in the table below,
18 are expected to be \$6,604 million:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Construction</u>
2021	\$1,269,323
2022	\$1,290,947
2023	\$1,275,154
2024	\$1,379,062
2025	\$1,389,258
Total	<u><u>\$6,603,744</u></u>

1 These expenditures represent approximately 65% (\$6,604 million ÷ \$10,181
2 million) of the Company’s total net utility plant at December 31, 2020. Of the
3 construction expenditures shown above, \$4,594 million relates to the Company’s
4 electric distribution operations. A reasonable opportunity to experience a fair rate
5 of return represents the key to a financial profile that will provide the Company
6 with the ability to raise capital in all market conditions to meet its needs, and to
7 satisfy investor requirements in an evolving industry.

8 **14. Q. How should the Commission respond to the evolving business environment**
9 **facing the Company?**

10 A. In the situation where additional capital is required, as shown by the projected
11 construction expenditures indicated above, the regulatory process must establish a
12 return on equity that provides a reasonable opportunity for the Company to
13 actually achieve its cost of capital. Where ongoing capital investment is required
14 to meet the high quality of service that customers demand, supportive regulation
15 is essential.

1 **18. Q. Is knowledge of a utility's bond rating an important factor in assessing its**
2 **risk and cost of capital?**

3 A. Yes. Knowledge of a company's credit quality rating is an important determinant
4 in analyzing a company's cost of equity because the cost of each type of capital is
5 directly related to the associated risk of the firm. So, while a company's credit
6 quality risk is directly shown by the rating and yield on its bonds, these relative
7 risk assessments also bear upon the cost of equity. This is because a firm's cost
8 of equity is represented by its borrowing cost plus a premium to recognize the
9 higher risk of an equity investment compared to debt.

10 **19. Q. How do the bond ratings compare for PECO, the Electric Group, and the**
11 **S&P Public Utilities?**

12 A. Presently, the issuer credit rating for PECO is BBB+ (A on First Mortgage
13 Bonds) from Standard and Poor's Corporation ("S&P") and the Long Term
14 ("LT") issuer rating is A2 (Aa3 on First Mortgage Bonds) from Moody's
15 Investors Services ("Moody's"). The issuer credit rating designation by S&P and
16 LT issuer rating by Moody's focus upon the credit quality of the issuer of the
17 debt, rather than upon the debt obligation itself. The Company's credit quality is
18 similar to that of the Electric Group, which has an average A2 and BBB+ credit
19 rating from Moody's and S&P, respectively. For the S&P Public Utilities, the
20 average composite credit rating is A3 by Moody's and BBB+ by S&P. Many of
21 the financial indicators which I will subsequently discuss are considered during
22 the rating process.

1 **20. Q. How do the financial data compare for PECO, the Electric Group, and the**
2 **S&P Public Utilities?**

3 A. The broad categories of financial data that I will discuss are shown on Schedules
4 2, 3, and 4. The data cover the five-year period 2015-2019. I will highlight the
5 important categories of relative risk may be summarized as follows:

6 Size. In terms of capitalization, PECO is smaller than the average size of the
7 Electric Group and the S&P Public Utilities. All other things being equal, a
8 smaller company is riskier than a larger company, because a given change in
9 revenue and expense has a proportionately greater impact on a small firm.

10 Market Ratios. Historical market-based financial ratios, such as price-earnings
11 multiples and dividend yields, provide a partial measure of the investor-required
12 cost of equity. If all other factors are equal, investors will require a higher rate of
13 return for companies which exhibit greater risk, in order to compensate for that
14 risk. That is to say, a firm that investors perceive to have higher risks will
15 experience a lower price per share in relation to expected earnings.

16 Since PECO's stock is not traded, there are no market ratios for the Company.

17 The five-year average price-earnings multiple was fairly similar for the Electric
18 Group and the S&P Public Utilities. The five-year average dividend yield for the
19 Electric Group was somewhat higher than the S&P Public Utilities. The average
20 market-to-book ratios were somewhat lower for the Electric Group than the S&P
21 Public Utilities.

1 Common Equity Ratio. The level of financial risk is measured by the proportion
2 of long-term debt and other senior capital that is contained in a company's
3 capitalization. Financial risk is also analyzed by comparing common equity ratios
4 (the complement of the ratio of debt and other senior capital). That is to say, a
5 firm with a high common equity ratio has low financial risk, while a firm with a
6 low common equity ratio has high financial risk. The five-year average common
7 equity ratios, based on permanent capital based on book value, were 54.1% for
8 PECO, 47.7% for the Electric Group, and 42.2% for the S&P Public Utilities.
9 This shows that the financial risk of PECO historically was somewhat less than
10 that of the Electric Group.

11 Return on Book Equity. Greater variability (i.e., uncertainty) of a firm's earned
12 returns signifies relative levels of risk, as shown by the coefficient of variation
13 (standard deviation ÷ mean) of the rate of return on book common equity. The
14 higher the coefficient of variation, the greater degree of variability. During the
15 five-year period, the coefficients of variation were 0.048 (0.6% ÷ 12.6%) for
16 PECO, 0.098 (0.9% ÷ 9.2%) for the Electric Group, and 0.049 (0.5% ÷ 10.2%) for
17 the S&P Public Utilities. These comparisons show similar earnings variability for
18 the Company and the S&P Public Utilities and higher variability for the Electric
19 Group.

20 Operating Ratios. I have also compared operating ratios (the percentage of
21 revenues consumed by operating expense, depreciation and taxes other than
22 income). The five-year average operating ratios were 78.0% for PECO, 76.8%

1 for the Electric Group, and 78.8% for the S&P Public Utilities. The operating
2 ratio for PECO was similar to the Electric Group and the S&P Public Utilities.

3 Coverage. The level of fixed charge coverage (i.e., the multiple by which
4 available earnings cover fixed charges, such as interest expense) provides an
5 indication of the earnings protection for creditors. Higher levels of coverage, and
6 hence earnings protection for fixed charges, are usually associated with superior
7 grades of creditworthiness. The five-year average pre-tax interest coverage
8 (excluding AFUDC) was 5.14 times for PECO, 3.48 times for the Electric Group,
9 and 3.22 times for the S&P Public Utilities. The higher interest coverage for
10 PECO suggests lower credit risk.

11 Quality of Earnings. Measures of earnings quality are usually revealed by the
12 percentage of AFUDC related to income available for common equity, the
13 effective income tax rate, and other cost deferrals. These measures of earnings
14 quality usually influence a firm's internally generated funds. Quality of earnings
15 has not been a significant concern for PECO, the Electric Group, and the S&P
16 Public Utilities.

17 Internally Generated Funds. Internally generated funds (“IGF”) provide an
18 important source of new investment capital for a utility and represent a key
19 measure of credit strength. Historically, the five-year average percentage of IGF
20 to construction expenditures was 71.5% for PECO, 77.6% for the Electric Group,
21 and 74.1% for the S&P Public Utilities. The IGF for PECO was weaker than the
22 reference groups, indicating more risk.

1 Betas. The financial data that I have been discussing relate primarily to company-
2 specific risks. Market risk for firms with publicly-traded stock is measured by
3 beta coefficients. Beta coefficients attempt to identify systematic risk, i.e., the
4 risk associated with changes in the overall market for common equities. Value
5 Line publishes such a statistical measure of a stock's relative historical volatility
6 to the rest of the market. A comparison of market risk is shown by the Value Line
7 betas of .90 as the average for the Electric Group provided on page 2 of Schedule
8 3 and .91 as the average for the S&P Public Utilities provided on page 3 of
9 Schedule 4. The systematic risk was similar for the Electric Group and the S&P
10 Public Utilities.

11 **21. Q. Please summarize your risk evaluation of PECO and the Electric Group.**

12 A. The investment risk of PECO parallels that of the Electric Group in certain
13 respects. In certain regards, principally related to its smaller size and weaker IGF
14 to construction, PECO has higher risk traits. PECO has lower risk as shown by its
15 higher common equity operating ratio, lower earnings variability, and higher
16 interest coverages. Operating ratios and quality earnings indicate comparable risk
17 to the Electric Group. On balance, the cost of equity for the Electric Group would
18 fairly represent the Company's cost of equity for this case.

19 **IV. RECOMMENDED CAPITAL STRUCTURE RATIOS**

20 **22. Q. Please explain the selection of capital structure ratios for PECO.**

21 A. The capital structure ratios of PECO should be employed for rate of return
22 purposes. If the operating public utility raises its own debt directly in the capital

1 markets, as PECO does, the operating public utility's own capital structure ratios
2 should be used to determine its overall rate of return. Additionally, if the
3 Company's actual capital structure ratios are used, as they should be, then
4 consistency requires that the embedded cost rates associated with the senior
5 securities reflected in those capital structure ratios should also be employed.

6 **23. Q. Does Schedule 5 provide the Company's capitalization and capital structure**
7 **ratios?**

8 A. Yes. The capitalization and capital structure ratios at December 31, 2020, 2021,
9 and 2022 correspond with the end of the historic test year ("HTY"), future test
10 year ("FTY"), and fully projected future test year ("FPFTY") in this case. The
11 capitalization and capital structure ratios for the FTY and FPFTY reflect the
12 Company's recent issuance of \$375 million of long term debt in March 2021, and
13 its planned issuances of \$375 million in the third quarter of 2021, \$300 million in
14 the first quarter of 2022, and \$425 million in the third quarter of 2022. A \$300
15 million debt maturity will occur in the third quarter of 2021 and a \$350 million
16 debt maturity will occur in the third quarter of 2022. Future equity financings
17 include \$406.3 million in the FTY and \$263.7 million in the FPFTY. The build-
18 up of retained earnings is also reflected. In presenting the Company's capital
19 structure on Schedule 5, I have removed the call premiums on the early
20 redemption of high-cost long-term debt and preferred stock.

1 **24. Q. Please describe the adjustment for the call premiums paid to redeem high-**
2 **cost debt and preferred stock**

3 A. I have adjusted the principal amounts of long-term debt to exclude the amounts
4 used to finance premiums paid for the early redemption of long-term debt and
5 preferred stock previously redeemed. To do otherwise would deny PECO the
6 opportunity to recover the costs (i.e., a return on and of the money used to fund
7 the call premiums) it incurred solely to redeem high-cost capital. The additional
8 debt PECO issued to finance the call premiums does not increase the Company's
9 rate base. That is to say, no additional rate base was created as a consequence of
10 issuing additional debt and preferred stock to finance the redemptions. Therefore,
11 an adjustment to the capitalization is required to provide the return necessary to
12 service the additional capital PECO issued to fund the call premiums. Thus,
13 while rate base does not change, the return component of the overall cost of
14 capital reflects an adjustment that, when applied to the rate base, furnishes the
15 return necessary to pay the cost of the incremental capitalization that supported
16 the call premiums paid by PECO.

17 The adjustment for call premiums is appropriate because customers receive all of
18 the cost savings, in the form of a lower overall rate of return, produced by
19 refinancing higher-cost debt and preferred stock, while PECO is simply made
20 whole by recovering the actual costs it incurred to provide these benefits to its
21 customers. In order to produce the savings that resulted from redeeming higher-
22 cost debt and preferred stock, the Company paid to the holders of that debt and
23 preferred stock a premium to surrender their securities prior to maturity. Those

1 premiums represented an investment made by PECO to reduce its overall cost of
2 capital. Because the reduced interest costs and preferred stock dividends are
3 reflected in the lower cost of capital to customers, it is proper that the Company
4 recover the costs incurred to produce these savings, which consist of a return of
5 and a return on the unamortized premiums. Adjusting the principal amounts in
6 the capital structure provides for the appropriate cost recovery by providing a
7 return on the funds used to pay the premiums, which is reflected as an increment
8 included in the embedded cost rates of PECO's total capital.

9 **25. Q. Should short-term debt be included in the capital structure for rate of return**
10 **purposes?**

11 A. There is no need to consider short-term debt in the capital structure because the
12 amount of short-term debt is well below the construction work in progress
13 ("CWIP") at the end of the FTY and the FPFTY. Exclusion of short-term debt is
14 required because it finances CWIP and hence the cost of short-term debt is
15 reflected in the AFUDC rate. To avoid double-counting, short-term debt must be
16 excluded from the capital structure ratios when setting base rates.

17 **26. Q. What capital structure ratios do you recommend for determining PECO's**
18 **overall cost of capital in this proceeding?**

19 A. Because rate-setting is prospective, the rate of return should, at a minimum,
20 reflect known or reasonably foreseeable changes which will occur during the
21 course of the test year. As a result, I will adopt the Company's FPFTY capital
22 structure ratios of 46.59% long-term debt and 53.41% common equity.

1 **28. Q. What cost rate have you determined for the Company’s long-term debt?**

2 A. I will adopt the 3.93% embedded cost of long-term debt at December 31, 2022, as
3 shown on Schedule 6, page 3. This rate is related to the amount of long-term debt
4 shown in the last three columns of Schedule 5, which provides the basis for the
5 46.59% long-term debt ratio.

6 **VI. COST OF EQUITY – GENERAL APPROACH**

7 **29. Q. Please describe how you determined the cost of equity for the Company.**

8 A. Although my fundamental financial analysis provides the required framework to
9 establish the risk relationships among PECO, the Electric Group, and the S&P
10 Public Utilities, the cost of equity must be measured by standard financial models
11 that I identified above. Differences in risk traits, such as size, business
12 diversification, geographical diversity, regulatory policy, financial leverage, and
13 bond ratings must be considered when analyzing the cost of equity.

14 It is also important to reiterate that no one method or model of the cost of equity
15 can be applied in an isolated manner. Rather, informed judgment must be used to
16 take into consideration the relative risk traits of the firm. It is for this reason that I
17 have used more than one method to measure the Company’s cost of equity. As I
18 describe below, each of the methods used to measure the cost of equity contains
19 certain incomplete and/or overly restrictive assumptions and constraints that are
20 not optimal. Therefore, I favor considering the results from a variety of methods.
21 In this regard, I applied each of the methods with data taken from the Electric

1 Group and arrived at a cost of equity of 10.95% for PECO, which includes 0.25%
2 in recognition of exemplary management performance.

3 VII. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW

4 **30. Q. Please describe the Discounted Cash Flow model.**

5 A. The DCF model seeks to explain the value of an asset as the present value of
6 future expected cash flows discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted rate of
7 return. In its simplest form, the DCF-determined return on common stock
8 consists of a current cash (dividend) yield and future price appreciation (growth)
9 of the investment. The dividend discount equation is the familiar DCF valuation
10 model, which assumes that future dividends are systematically related to one
11 another by a constant growth rate. The DCF formula is derived from the standard
12 valuation model: $P = D/(k-g)$, where P = price, D = dividend, k = the cost of
13 equity, and g = growth in cash flows. By rearranging the terms, we obtain the
14 familiar DCF equation: $k = D/P + g$. All of the terms in the DCF equation
15 represent investors' assessment of expected future cash flows that they will
16 receive in relation to the value that they set for a share of stock (P). The DCF
17 equation is sometimes referred to as the "Gordon" model.³ My DCF results are
18 provided on Schedule 1, page 2, for the Electric Group. The DCF return is
19 10.66% with the leverage adjustment and 9.23% without the leverage adjustment
20 for the Electric Group.

³ Although the popular application of the DCF model is often attributed to the work of Myron J. Gordon in the mid-1950's, J. B. Williams explicated the DCF model in its present form nearly two decades earlier.

1 Among other limitations of the model, there is a certain element of circularity in
2 the DCF method when applied in rate cases. This is because investors'
3 expectations for the future depend upon regulatory decisions. In turn, when
4 regulators depend upon the DCF model to set the cost of equity, they rely upon
5 investor expectations that include an assessment of how regulators will decide
6 rate cases. Due to this circularity, the DCF model may not fully reflect the true
7 risk of a utility.

8 **31. Q. What is the dividend yield component of a DCF analysis?**

9 A. The dividend yield reveals the portion of investors' cash flow that is generated by
10 the return provided by the dividends an investor receives. It is measured by the
11 dividends per share relative to the price per share. The DCF methodology requires
12 the use of an expected dividend yield to establish the investor-required cost of
13 equity. For the twelve months ended December 2020, the monthly dividend
14 yields are shown on Schedule 7. The month-end prices were adjusted to reflect
15 the buildup of the dividend in the price that has occurred since the last ex-
16 dividend date (i.e., the date by which a shareholder must own the shares to be
17 entitled to the dividend payment – usually about two to three weeks prior to the
18 actual payment).

19 For the twelve months ended December 2020, the average dividend yield was
20 3.91% for the Electric Group based upon a calculation using annualized dividend
21 payments and adjusted month-end stock prices. The dividend yields for the more
22 recent six-month and three-month periods were 3.97% and 3.90%, respectively.

1 For applying the DCF model, I have used the six-month average dividend yield of
2 3.97% for the Electric Group. The use of this dividend yield will reflect current
3 capital costs, while avoiding spot yields. For the purpose of a DCF calculation,
4 the average dividend yield must be adjusted to reflect the prospective nature of
5 the dividend payments, i.e., the higher expected dividends for the future. Recall
6 that the DCF is an expectational model that must reflect investors' anticipated
7 cash flows. I have adjusted the six-month average dividend yield in three
8 different, but generally accepted, manners. The three calculations for expected
9 increases in dividends are at one-half the growth component, a second for discrete
10 growth in the quarterly dividend, and a third reflecting the compounding of
11 annual quarterly dividends. I then used the average of the three adjusted values as
12 calculated in the lower panel of data presented on Schedule 7. This adjustment
13 adds eleven basis points to the six-month average historical yield, thus producing
14 the 4.08% adjusted dividend yield for the Electric Group.

15 **32. Q. What factors influence investors' growth expectations?**

16 A. As noted previously, investors are interested principally in the dividend yield and
17 future growth of their investment (i.e., the price per share of the stock). Future
18 growth in earnings per share is the DCF model's primary focus because, under the
19 model's assumption that the price-earnings multiple remains constant, the price
20 per share of stock will grow at the same rate as earnings per share. A growth rate
21 analysis considers a variety of variables to reach a consensus of prospective
22 growth, including historical data and widely available analysts' forecasts of
23 earnings, dividends, book value, and cash flow (all stated on a per-share basis). A

1 fundamental growth rate analysis is frequently based upon internal growth (“ $b \times$
2 r ”), where “ r ” is the expected rate of return on common equity and “ b ” is the
3 retention rate (a fraction representing the proportion of earnings not paid out as
4 dividends). To be complete, the internal growth rate should be modified to
5 account for sales of new common stock (external growth), which is represented
6 by the formula $s \times v$, where “ s ” is the number of new common shares the firm
7 expects to issue and “ v ” is the value that accrues to existing shareholders from
8 selling stock at a price above book value. Fundamental growth, which combines
9 internal and external growth, encompasses the factors that cause book value per
10 share to grow over time.

11 Growth also can be expressed in multiple stages. This expression of growth
12 consists of an initial “growth” stage where a firm enjoys rapidly expanding
13 markets, high profit margins, and abnormally high growth in earnings per share.
14 Thereafter, a firm enters a “transition” stage where fewer technological advances
15 and increased product saturation begin to reduce the growth rate and profit
16 margins come under pressure. During the “transition” phase, investment
17 opportunities begin to mature, capital requirements decline, and a firm begins to
18 pay out a larger percentage of earnings to shareholders. Finally, the mature or
19 “steady-state” stage is reached when a firm’s earnings growth, payout ratio, and
20 return on equity stabilize at levels where they remain for the life of a firm. The
21 three stages of growth assume a step-down of high initial growth to lower
22 sustainable growth. Even if these three stages of growth can be envisioned for a
23 firm, the third “steady-state” growth stage, which is assumed to remain fixed in

1 perpetuity, represents an unrealistic expectation because the three stages of
2 growth can be repeated. That is to say, the stages can be repeated where growth
3 for a firm ramps-up and ramps-down in cycles over time. For these reasons, there
4 is no need to analyze growth rates individually for each cycle, but rather to rely
5 upon analysts' growth forecasts, which are those used by investors when pricing
6 common stocks.

7 **33. Q. How did you determine an appropriate growth rate?**

8 A. The growth rate used in a DCF calculation should measure investor expectations.
9 Investors consider both company-specific variables and overall market sentiment
10 (i.e., level of inflation rates, interest rates, economic conditions, etc.) when
11 balancing their capital gains expectations with their dividend yield requirements.
12 Investors are not influenced solely by a single set of company-specific variables
13 weighted in a formulaic manner. Therefore, all relevant growth rate indicators
14 should be evaluated using a variety of techniques when formulating a judgment of
15 investor-expected growth.

16 **34. Q. What data for the Electric Group have you considered in your growth rate
17 analysis?**

18 A. I considered the growth in the financial variables shown on Schedules 8 and 9,
19 which reflect historical (Schedule 8) and projected (Schedule 9) rates of growth in
20 earnings per share, dividends per share, book value per share, and cash flow per
21 share for the Electric Group. While analysts will review all measures of growth,
22 as I have done, earnings per share growth directly influences the expectations of

1 investors for the future performance of utility stocks. Forecasts of earnings
2 growth are required because the DCF model is forward-looking, and, with the
3 constant price-earnings multiple and constant payout ratio that the DCF model
4 assumes, all other measures of growth will mirror earnings growth. The historical
5 growth rates were obtained from the Value Line publication that provides those
6 data. While historical data cannot be ignored, it is much less significant in
7 applying the DCF model than projections of future growth. Investors cannot
8 purchase the past earnings of a utility. To the contrary, they are only entitled to
9 future earnings, which are the focus of growth projections. Furthermore, if
10 significant weight is assigned to historical performance, the historical data are
11 double counted because they are already factored into analysts' forecasts of
12 earnings growth.

13 **35. Q. Is a five-year investment horizon associated with the analysts' forecasts**
14 **consistent with the traditional DCF model?**

15 A. Yes, it is. Although the constant form of the DCF model assumes an infinite
16 stream of cash flows, investors do not expect to hold an investment indefinitely.
17 Rather than viewing the DCF in the context of an endless stream of growing
18 dividends (e.g., a century of cash flows), the growth in the share value (i.e.,
19 capital appreciation, or capital gains yield) is most relevant to investors' total
20 return expectations. Hence, the sale price of a stock can be viewed as a
21 liquidating dividend that can be discounted along with the annual dividend
22 receipts during the investment-holding period to arrive at the investors' expected
23 return. The growth in the price per share will equal the growth in earnings per

1 share if, as the DCF model assumes, there is no change in the price-earnings (“P-
2 E”) multiple. As such, my company-specific growth analysis, which focuses
3 principally upon five-year forecasts of earnings per share growth, conforms with
4 the type of analysis that influences investors’ expectations of their actual total
5 return. Moreover, academic research focuses also on five-year growth rates
6 specifically because market outcomes occurring over that investment horizon are
7 what influence stock prices. Indeed, if investors required forecasts beyond five
8 years in order to properly value common stocks, then it would be reasonable to
9 expect that some investment advisory service would begin publishing that
10 information for individual stocks in order to meet the demands of the
11 marketplace. The absence of such a publication suggests that there is no market
12 for this information because investors do not require forecasts for an infinite
13 series of future data points in order to make informed decisions to purchase and
14 sell stocks.

15 **36. Q. What are the analysts’ forecasts of future growth that you considered?**

16 A. Schedule 9 provides projected earnings per share growth rates taken from
17 analysts’ five-year forecasts compiled by IBES/First Call, Zacks, and Value Line.
18 These are all reliable authorities of projected growth that investors use to make
19 buy, sell and hold decisions. The IBES/First Call, and Zacks estimates are
20 obtained from the Internet and are widely available to investors. The growth rates
21 reported by IBES/First Call and Zacks are consensus forecasts taken from a
22 survey of analysts that make growth projections for these companies. Notably,
23 First Call’s earnings forecasts are frequently quoted in the financial press. The

1 Value Line forecasts also are widely available to investors and can be obtained by
2 subscription or free-of-charge at most public and collegiate libraries. The
3 IBES/First Call, and Zacks forecasts are limited to earnings per share growth,
4 while Value Line makes projections of other financial variables. The Value Line
5 forecasts of dividends per share, book value per share, and cash flow per share for
6 the Electric Group are also included on Schedule 9.

7 **37. Q. What are the projected growth rates published by the sources you discussed?**

8 A. Schedule 9 shows the prospective five-year earnings per share growth rates
9 projected for the Electric Group by IBES/First Call (4.28%), Zacks (4.29%), and
10 Value Line (5.17%).

11 **38. Q. Are certain growth rate forecasts entitled to greater weight in developing a
12 growth rate for use in the DCF model?**

13 A. Yes. While a variety of factors should be examined to reach a reasonable
14 conclusion on the DCF growth rate, growth in earnings per share should receive
15 the greatest emphasis. Growth in earnings per share is the primary determinant of
16 investors' expectations of the total returns they will obtain from stocks because
17 the capital gains yield (i.e., price appreciation) will track earnings growth if the P-
18 E multiple remains constant, as the DCF model assumes. Moreover, earnings per
19 share (derived from net income) are the source of dividend payments and are the
20 primary driver of retention growth and its surrogate, i.e., book value per share
21 growth. As such, under these circumstances, greater emphasis must be placed
22 upon projected earnings per share growth. In fact, Professor Myron Gordon, the

1 foremost proponent of the use of the DCF model in setting utility rates, concluded
2 that the best measure of growth for use in the DCF model is a forecast of earnings
3 per-share growth.⁴ Consistent with Professor Gordon's findings, projections of
4 earnings per share growth, such as those published by IBES/First Call, Zacks, and
5 Value Line, provide the best indication of investor expectations.

6 **39. Q. What growth rate do you use in your DCF model?**

7 A. The forecasts shown on Schedule 9 for the Electric Group exhibit a range of
8 average earnings per share growth rates from 4.28% to 5.17%. DCF growth rates
9 should not be established by mathematical formulation, and I have not done so.
10 In my opinion, a growth rate of 5.15% is a reasonable estimate of investor-
11 expected growth for the Electric Group. This value is within the array of
12 analysts' forecasts of five-year earnings per share growth rates and is below the
13 midpoint of that data set. The reasonableness of this growth rate is also supported
14 by the expected continuation of gas utility infrastructure spending.

15 **40. Q. Are the dividend yield and growth components of the DCF adequate to**
16 **accurately depict the rate of return on common equity when it is used to**
17 **calculate a utility's weighted average overall cost of capital?**

18 A. The components of the DCF model are adequate for that purpose only if the
19 capital structure ratios are measured by the market value of debt and equity. In
20 the case of the Electric Group, average capital structure ratios are 40.98% long-

⁴ Gordon, Gordon & Gould, "Choice Among Methods of Estimating Share Yield," The Journal of Portfolio Management (Spring 1989).

1 term debt, 0.04% preferred stock, and 58.97% common equity, as shown on
2 Schedule 10. If book values are used to compute the capital structure ratios, then
3 a leverage adjustment is required.

4 **41. Q. What is a leverage adjustment?**

5 A. If a firm's capitalization, as measured by its stock price, diverges from its
6 capitalization, measured at book value, the potential exists for a financial risk
7 difference. Such a risk difference arises because a market-valued capitalization
8 contains more equity and less debt than a book-value capitalization and, therefore,
9 has less risk than the book-value capitalization. A leverage adjustment properly
10 accounts for the risk differential between market-value and book-value capital
11 structures.

12 **42. Q. Why is a leverage adjustment necessary?**

13 A. In order to make the DCF results relevant to the capitalization measured at book
14 value (as is done for rate setting purposes), the market-derived cost rate must be
15 adjusted to account for this difference in financial risk. The only perspective that
16 is important to investors is the return that they can realize on the market value of
17 their investment. As I have measured the DCF, the simple yield (D/P) plus
18 growth (g) provides a return applicable strictly to the price (P) that an investor is
19 willing to pay for a share of stock. The need for the leverage adjustment arises
20 when the results of the DCF model (k) are to be applied to a capital structure that
21 is different from the capital structure indicated by the market price (P). From the
22 market perspective, the financial risk of the Electric Group is accurately measured

1 by the capital structure ratios calculated from the market-valued capitalization of
2 a firm. If the rate setting process utilized the market capitalization ratios, then no
3 additional analysis or adjustment would be required, and the simple yield (D/P)
4 plus growth (g) components of the DCF would satisfy the financial risk associated
5 with the market value of the equity capitalization. Because the rate-setting
6 process uses ratios calculated from a firm's book value capitalization, further
7 analysis is required to synchronize the financial risk of the book capitalization
8 with the required return on the book value of the firm's equity. This adjustment is
9 developed through precise mathematical calculations, using well recognized
10 analytical procedures that are widely accepted in the financial literature. To
11 arrive at that return, the rate of return on common equity is the unleveraged cost
12 of capital (or equity return at 100% equity) plus one or more terms reflecting the
13 increase in financial risk resulting from the use of leverage in the capital structure.
14 The calculations presented in the lower panel of data shown on Schedule 10,
15 under the heading "M&M," provides a return of 7.24% when applicable to a
16 capital structure with 100% common equity.

17 **43. Q. Are there specific factors that influence market-to-book ratios that**
18 **determine whether the leverage adjustment should be made?**

19 A. No. The leverage adjustment is not intended, nor was it designed, to address the
20 reasons that stock prices vary from book value. Hence, any observations
21 concerning market prices relative to book are not on point. The leverage
22 adjustment deals with the issue of financial risk and does not transform the DCF
23 result to a book value return through a market-to-book adjustment. Again, the

1 leverage adjustment that I propose is based on the fundamental financial precept
2 that the cost of equity is equal to the rate of return for an unleveraged firm (i.e.,
3 where the overall rate of return equates to the cost of equity with a capital
4 structure that contains 100% equity) plus the additional return required for
5 introducing debt and/or preferred stock leverage into the capital structure.

6 Further, as noted previously, the relatively high market prices of utility stocks
7 cannot be attributed solely to the notion that these companies are expected to earn
8 a return on the book value of equity that differs from their cost of equity
9 determined from stock market prices. Stock prices above book value are common
10 for utility stocks, and indeed the stock prices of non-regulated companies exceed
11 book values by even greater margins. It is difficult to accept that the vast majority
12 of all firms operating in our economy are generating returns far in excess of their
13 cost of capital. Certainly, in our free-market economy, competition should
14 contain such “excesses” if they actually existed.

15 Finally, the leverage adjustment adds stability to the final DCF cost rate. That is
16 to say, as the market capitalization increases relative to its book value, the
17 leverage adjustment increases while the simple yield (D/P) plus growth (g) result
18 declines. The reverse is also true: when the market capitalization declines, the
19 leverage adjustment also declines as the simple yield (D/P) plus growth (g) result
20 increases.

1 **44. Q. Is the leverage adjustment that you propose designed to transform the**
2 **market return into one that is designed to produce a particular market-to-**
3 **book ratio?**

4 A. No, it is not. What I label a “leverage adjustment” is merely a convenient way of
5 showing the amount that must be added to (or subtracted from) the result of the
6 simple DCF model (i.e., $D/P + g$) when the DCF return applies to a capital
7 structure used for ratemaking that is computed with book-value weighting rather
8 than market-value weighting. Although I specify a separate factor, which I call
9 the leverage adjustment, there is no need to do so other than to identify this factor.
10 If I expressed my return solely in the context of the book value weighting that we
11 use to calculate the weighted average cost of capital and ignore the familiar $D/P +$
12 g expression entirely, then a separate element in the DCF cost of equity
13 determination would not be needed to reflect the differential in financial leverage
14 between a market-value and book-value capitalization. As shown in the bottom
15 panel of data on Schedule 10, the equity return applicable to the book value
16 common equity ratio is equal to 7.24%, which is the return for the Electric Group
17 appropriate for a capital structure with no debt (i.e., a 100% equity ratio) plus
18 3.41% to compensate investors for the risk of a 54.09% debt ratio and 0.01%
19 associated with the 0.27% preferred stock ratio. Under this approach, the parts
20 sum to 10.66% (7.24% + 3.41% + 0.01%), and there is no need to even address
21 the cost of equity in terms of $D/P + g$. To express this same return in the context
22 of the familiar DCF model, I summed the 4.08% dividend yield, the 5.15%
23 growth rate, and 1.43% for the leverage adjustment in order to arrive at the same

1 10.66% (4.08% + 5.15% + 1.43%) return. I know of no means to mathematically
2 solve for the 1.43% leverage adjustment by expressing it in the terms of any
3 particular relationship of market price to book value. The 1.43% adjustment is
4 merely a convenient way to compare the 10.66% return computed using the
5 Modigliani & Miller formulas to the 9.23% return generated by the DCF model
6 (i.e., $D_1/P_0 + g$, or the traditional form of the DCF shown on Schedule 7, page 1)
7 based on a market-value capital structure. A 9.23% return assigned to anything
8 other than the market value of equity cannot equate to a reasonable return on book
9 value that has higher financial risk. My point is that when we use a market-
10 determined cost of equity developed from the DCF model, it reflects a level of
11 financial risk that is different (in this case, lower) from the capital structure stated
12 at book value. This process has nothing to do with targeting any particular
13 market-to-book ratio.

14 **45. Q. Please provide the DCF return based upon your preceding discussion of**
15 **dividend yield, growth, and leverage.**

16 A. As explained previously, I have utilized a six-month average dividend yield
17 (" D_1/P_0 ") adjusted in a forward-looking manner for my DCF calculation. This
18 dividend yield is used in conjunction with the growth rate (" g ") previously
19 developed. The DCF also includes the leverage modification (" $lev.$ ") required
20 when the book value equity ratio is used in determining the weighted average cost
21 of capital in the rate-setting process rather than the market value equity ratio
22 related to the price of stock. The resulting DCF cost rate is 10.66%, computed as
23 follows:

$$D_1/P_0 + g + lev. = K$$

$$\text{Electric Group } 4.08\% + 5.15\% + 1.43\% = 10.66\%$$

1 The DCF result shown above represents the simplified (i.e., Gordon) form of the
2 model that contains a constant-growth assumption. I should reiterate, however,
3 that the DCF-indicated cost rate provides an explanation of the rate of return on
4 common stock market prices without regard to the prospect of a change in the
5 price-earnings multiple. An assumption that there will be no change in the price-
6 earnings multiple is not supported by the realities of the equity market because
7 price-earnings multiples do not remain constant. This is one of the constraints of
8 this model that makes it important to consider the results of other models when
9 determining a company's cost of equity.

10 VIII. RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS

11 **46. Q. Please describe your use of the risk premium approach to determine the cost**
12 **of equity.**

13 A. With the Risk Premium approach, the cost of equity capital is determined by
14 corporate bond yields plus a premium to account for the fact that common equity
15 is exposed to greater investment risk than debt capital. The result of my Risk
16 Premium study is shown on Schedule 1, page 2. That result is 10.00%.

17 **47. Q. What long-term public utility debt cost rate did you use in your risk**
18 **premium analysis?**

19 A. In my opinion, and as I will explain in more detail further in my testimony, a

1 3.25% yield represents a reasonable estimate of the prospective yield on long-
2 term A-rated public utility bonds.

3 **48. Q. What historical data are shown by the Moody's data?**

4 A. I have analyzed the historical yields on the Moody's index of long-term public
5 utility debt as shown on Schedule 11, page 1. For the twelve months ended
6 December 2020, the average monthly yield on Moody's index of A-rated public
7 utility bonds was 3.02%. For the six and three-month periods ended December
8 2020, the yields were 2.81% and 2.86%, respectively. During the twelve-months
9 ended December 2020, the range of the yields on A-rated public utility bonds was
10 2.73% to 3.50%. Page 2 of Schedule 11 shows the long-run spread in yields
11 between A-rated public utility bonds and long-term Treasury bonds. As shown on
12 page 3 of Schedule 11, the yields on A-rated public utility bonds have exceeded
13 those on Treasury bonds by 1.45% on a twelve-month average basis, 1.32% on a
14 six-month average basis, and 1.24% on a three-month average basis. Giving
15 greater emphasis to the three-month average spread, which reflects the downtrend,
16 1.25% represents a reasonable spread for the yield on A-rated public utility bonds
17 over Treasury bonds.

18 **49. Q. What forecasts of interest rates have you considered in your analysis?**

19 A. I have determined the prospective yield on A-rated public utility debt by using the
20 Blue Chip Financial Forecasts ("Blue Chip") along with the spread in the yields
21 that I describe below. Blue Chip is a reliable authority and contains consensus
22 forecasts of a variety of interest rates compiled from a panel of banking,

1 brokerage, and investment advisory services. In early 1999, Blue Chip stopped
 2 publishing forecasts of yields on A-rated public utility bonds because the Federal
 3 Reserve deleted these yields from its Statistical Release H.15. To independently
 4 project a forecast of the yields on A-rated public utility bonds, I have combined
 5 the forecast yields on long-term Treasury bonds published on January 1, 2021,
 6 and a yield spread of 1.25%, derived from historical data.

7 **50. Q. How have you used these data to project the yield on A-rated public utility**
 8 **bonds for the purpose of your Risk Premium analyses?**

9 A. Shown below is my calculation of the prospective yield on A-rated public utility
 10 bonds using the building blocks discussed above, i.e., the Blue Chip forecast of
 11 Treasury bond yields and the public utility bond yield spread. For comparative
 12 purposes, I also have shown the Blue Chip forecasts of Aaa-rated and Baa-rated
 13 corporate bonds. These forecasts are:

Blue Chip Financial Forecasts						
Year	Quarter	Corporate		30-Year	A-rated Public Utility	
		Aaa-rated	Baa-rated	Treasury	Spread	Yield
2021	First	2.5%	3.5%	1.7%	1.25%	2.95%
2021	Second	2.5%	3.6%	1.8%	1.25%	3.05%
2021	Third	2.6%	3.7%	1.9%	1.25%	3.15%
2021	Fourth	2.7%	3.8%	2.0%	1.25%	3.25%
2022	First	2.8%	3.8%	2.1%	1.25%	3.35%
2022	Second	2.8%	3.8%	2.1%	1.25%	3.35%

14 **51. Q. Are there additional forecasts of interest rates that extend beyond those**
 15 **shown above?**

16 A. Yes. Twice yearly, Blue Chip provides long-term forecasts of interest rates. In

its December 1, 2020 publication, Blue Chip published longer-term forecasts of interest rates, which were reported to be:

Blue Chip Financial Forecasts			
Averages	Corporate		30-Year
	Aaa-rated	Baa-rated	Treasury
2022-2026	3.6%	4.6%	2.8%
2027-2031	4.5%	5.4%	3.6%

The longer-term forecasts by Blue Chip suggest that interest rates will move up from the levels revealed by the near-term forecasts. A 3.25% yield on A-rated public utility bonds represents a reasonable benchmark for measuring the cost of equity in this case. All the data I used to formulate my conclusion as to a prospective yield on A-rated public utility debt are available to investors, who regularly rely upon those data to make investment decisions.

52. Q. What equity risk premium have you determined for public utilities?

A. To develop an appropriate equity risk premium, I analyzed the results from 2020 SBBI Yearbook, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation. My investigation reveals that the equity risk premium varies according to the level of interest rates. That is to say, the equity risk premium increases as interest rates decline, and it declines as interest rates increase. This inverse relationship is revealed by the summary data presented below and shown on Schedule 12, page 1.

Common Equity Risk Premiums

Low Interest Rates	6.70%
Average Across All Interest Rates	5.69%
High Interest Rates	4.69%

1 Based on my analysis of the historical data, the equity risk premium was 6.70%
2 when the marginal cost of long-term government bonds was low (i.e., 2.88%,
3 which was the average yield during periods of low rates). Conversely, when the
4 yield on long-term government bonds was high (i.e., 7.09% on average during
5 periods of high interest rates), the spread narrowed to 4.69%. Over the entire
6 spectrum of interest rates, the equity risk premium was 5.69% when the average
7 government bond yield was 4.99%. I have utilized a 6.75% equity risk premium.
8 The equity risk premium of 6.75% that I employed is near the risk premiums
9 associated with low interest rates.

10 **53. Q. What common equity cost rate did you determine based on your risk**
11 **premium analysis?**

12 A. The cost of equity (i.e., “k”) is represented by the sum of the prospective yield for
13 long-term public utility debt (i.e., “i”), and the equity risk premium (i.e., “RP”).
14 The Risk Premium approach provides a cost of equity of 10.00%, computed as
15 follows:

$$i + RP = k$$

Electric Group 3.25% + 6.75% = 10.00%

1 **IX. CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL**

2 **54. Q. How is the CAPM used to measure the cost of equity?**

3 A. The CAPM uses the yield on a risk-free interest-bearing obligation plus a rate of
4 return premium that is proportional to the systematic risk of an investment. As
5 shown on page 2 of Schedule 1, the result of the CAPM is 12.67% for the Electric
6 Group. To compute the cost of equity with the CAPM, three components are
7 necessary: a risk-free rate of return (“Rf”), the beta measure of systematic risk
8 (“β”), and the market risk premium (“Rm-Rf”) derived from the total return on the
9 market of equities reduced by the risk-free rate of return. The CAPM specifically
10 accounts for differences in systematic risk (i.e., market risk as measured by the
11 beta) between an individual firm or group of firms and the entire market of
12 equities.

13 **55. Q. What betas have you considered in the CAPM?**

14 A. For my CAPM analysis, I initially considered the Value Line betas. As shown on
15 page 2 of Schedule 3, the average beta is 0.90 for the Electric Group.

16 **56. Q. Did you use the Value Line betas in the CAPM determined cost of equity?**

17 A. I used the Value Line betas as a foundation for the leverage adjusted betas that I
18 used in the CAPM. The betas must be reflective of the financial risk associated
19 with the rate-setting capital structure that is measured at book value. Therefore,
20 Value Line betas cannot be used directly in the CAPM, unless the cost rate
21 developed using those betas is applied to a capital structure measured with market

1 values. To develop a CAPM cost rate applicable to a book-value capital structure,
2 the Value Line (market value) betas have been unleveraged and re-leveraged for
3 the book value common equity ratios using the Hamada formula,⁵ as follows:

$$\beta l = \beta u [1 + (1 - t) D/E + P/E]$$

4
5 where βl = the leveraged beta, βu = the unleveraged beta, t = income tax rate, D =
6 debt ratio, P = preferred stock ratio, and E = common equity ratio. The betas
7 published by Value Line have been calculated with the market price of stock and
8 are related to the market value capitalization. By using the formula shown above
9 and the capital structure ratios measured at market value, the beta would become
10 0.62 for the Electric Group if it employed no leverage and was 100% equity
11 financed. Those calculations are shown on Schedule 10 under the section labeled
12 “Hamada,” who is credited with developing those formulas. With the
13 unleveraged beta as a base, I calculated the leveraged beta of 1.10 for the book
14 value capital structure of the Electric Group.

15 **57. Q. What risk-free rate have you used in the CAPM?**

16 A. As shown on page 1 of Schedule 13, I provided the historical yields on Treasury
17 notes and bonds. For the twelve months ended December 2020, the average yield
18 on 30-year Treasury bonds was 1.56%. For the six- and three-months ended
19 December 2020, the yields on 30-year Treasury bonds were 1.49% and 1.62%,

⁵ Robert S. Hamada, “The Effects of the Firm’s Capital Structure on the Systematic Risk of Common Stocks” *The Journal of Finance* Vol. 27, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, December 27-29, 1971. (May 1972), pp. 435-452.

1 respectively. During the twelve-months ended December 2020, the range of the
2 yields on 30-year Treasury bonds was 1.27% to 2.22%. The low yields that
3 existed during recent years can be traced to weakness in business fixed investment
4 and exports due in part to the U.S.'s trade war with China. Recently,
5 extraordinary events associated with the COVID-19 pandemic prompted in the
6 Federal Open Market Committee ("FOMC") to reduce the Fed Funds rate to near
7 zero. The FOMC continues to support the money and capital markets during the
8 coronavirus pandemic.

9 As shown on page 2 of Schedule 13, forecasts published by Blue Chip on January
10 1, 2021 indicate that the yields on long-term Treasury bonds are expected to be in
11 the range of 1.7% to 2.1% during the next six quarters. The forecast for the
12 FPFTY is 2.1% for 30-year Treasury Bonds. The longer-term forecasts described
13 previously show that the yields on 30-year Treasury bonds will average 2.8%
14 from 2022 through 2026 and 3.6% from 2027 to 2031. For the reasons explained
15 previously, forecasts of interest rates should be emphasized at this time in
16 selecting the risk-free rate of return in CAPM. Hence, I have used a 2.00% risk-
17 free rate of return for CAPM purposes, which considers the Blue Chip forecasts.

18 **58. Q. What market premium have you used in the CAPM?**

19 A. As shown in the lower panel of data presented on Schedule 13, page 2 the market
20 premium is derived from historical data and the forecast returns. For the
21 historically based market premium, I have used the arithmetic mean obtained
22 from the data presented on Schedule 12, page 1. On that schedule, the market

1 return was 11.92% on large stocks during periods of low interest rates. During
2 those periods, the yield on long-term government bonds was 2.88% when interest
3 rates were low. As such, I carried over to Schedule 13, page 2, the average large
4 common stock returns of 11.92% and the average yield on long-term government
5 bonds of 2.88%. The resulting market premium is 9.04% (11.92% - 2.88%) based
6 on historical data, as shown on Schedule 13, page 2. As also shown on Schedule
7 13, page 2, I calculated the forecast returns, which show a 10.50% total market
8 return. With this forecast, I calculated a market premium of 8.50% (10.50% -
9 2.00%) using forecast data. The resulting market premium applicable to the
10 CAPM derived from these sources equals 8.77% (8.50% + 9.04% = 17.54% ÷ 2).

11 **59. Q. What does your CAPM analysis show?**

12 A. Using the 2.00% risk-free rate of return, the leverage adjusted beta of 1.10 for the
13 Electric Group, and the 8.77% market premium, the following result is indicated.

$$R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f) = k$$
$$\text{Electric Group } 2.00\% + 1.10 \times (8.77\%) = 11.65\%$$

14 **X. COMPARABLE EARNINGS APPROACH**

15 **60. Q. What is the Comparable Earnings approach?**

16 A. The Comparable Earnings approach estimates a fair return on equity by
17 comparing returns realized by non-regulated companies to returns that a public
18 utility with similar risks characteristics would need to realize in order to compete
19 for capital. Because regulation is a substitute for competitively determined prices,

1 the returns realized by non-regulated firms with comparable risks to a public
2 utility provide useful insight into investor expectations for public utility returns.
3 The firms selected for the Comparable Earnings approach should be companies
4 whose prices are not subject to cost-based price ceilings (i.e., non-regulated firms)
5 so that circularity is avoided.

6 There are two avenues available to implement the Comparable Earnings
7 approach. One method involves the selection of another industry (or industries)
8 with comparable risks to the public utility in question, and the results for all
9 companies within that industry serve as a benchmark. The second approach
10 requires the selection of parameters that represent similar risk traits for the public
11 utility and the comparable risk companies. Using this approach, the business lines
12 of the comparable companies become unimportant. The latter approach is
13 preferable with the further qualification that the comparable risk companies
14 exclude regulated firms in order to avoid the circular reasoning implicit in the use
15 of the achieved earnings/book ratios of other regulated firms. The United States
16 Supreme Court has held that:

17 A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to
18 earn a return on the value of the property which it employs
19 for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being
20 made at the same time and in the same general part of the
21 country on investments in other business undertakings which
22 are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties. The
23 return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in
24 the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate,
25 under efficient and economical management, to maintain and
26 support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary
27 for the proper discharge of its public duties. Bluefield Water
28 Works vs. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 668 (1923).

1 It is important to identify the returns earned by firms that compete for capital with
2 a public utility. This can be accomplished by analyzing the returns of non-
3 regulated firms that are subject to the competitive forces of the marketplace.

4 **61. Q. Did you compare the results of your DCF and CAPM analyses to the results**
5 **indicated by a Comparable Earnings approach?**

6 A. Yes. I selected companies from The Value Line Investment Survey for Windows
7 that have six categories of comparability designed to reflect the risk of the
8 Electric Group. These screening criteria were based upon the range as defined by
9 the rankings of the companies in the Electric Group. The items considered were:
10 Timeliness Rank, Safety Rank, Financial Strength, Price Stability, Value Line
11 betas, and Technical Rank. The definition for these parameters is provided on
12 Schedule 14, page 3. The identities of the companies comprising the Comparable
13 Earnings group and their associated rankings within the ranges are identified on
14 Schedule 14, page 1.

15 I relied upon Value Line data because they provide a comprehensive basis for
16 evaluating the risks of the comparable firms. As to the returns calculated by
17 Value Line for these companies, there is some downward bias in the figures
18 shown on Schedule 14, page 2, because Value Line computes the returns on year-
19 end rather than average book value. If average book values had been employed,
20 the rates of return would have been slightly higher. Nevertheless, these are the
21 returns considered by investors when taking positions in these stocks. Because
22 many of the comparability factors, as well as the published returns, are used by

1 investors in selecting stocks, and the fact that investors rely on the Value Line
2 service to gauge returns, it is an appropriate database for measuring comparable
3 return opportunities.

4 **62. Q. What data did you consider in your Comparable Earnings analysis?**

5 A. I used both historical realized returns and forecasted returns for non-utility
6 companies. As noted previously, I have not used returns for utility companies in
7 order to avoid the circularity that arises from using regulatory-influenced returns
8 to determine a regulated return. It is appropriate to consider a relatively long
9 measurement period in the Comparable Earnings approach in order to cover
10 conditions over an entire business cycle. A ten-year period (five historical years
11 and five projected years) is sufficient to cover an average business cycle. Unlike
12 the DCF and CAPM, the results of the Comparable Earnings method can be
13 applied directly to the book value capitalization. In other words, the Comparable
14 Earnings approach does not contain the potential misspecification contained in
15 market models when the market capitalization and book value capitalization
16 diverge significantly. A point of demarcation was chosen to eliminate the results
17 of highly profitable enterprises, which the Bluefield case stated were not the type
18 of returns that a utility was entitled to earn. For this purpose, I used 20% as the
19 point where those returns could be viewed as highly profitable and should be
20 excluded from the Comparable Earnings approach. The average historical rate of
21 return on book common equity was 12.2% using only the returns that were less
22 than 20%, as shown on Schedule 14, page 2. The average forecasted rate of
23 return as published by Value Line is 13.0% also using values less than 20%, as

1 provided on Schedule 14, page 2. Using the average of these data my
2 Comparable Earnings result is 12.60%, as shown on Schedule 1, page 2.

3 **XI. CONCLUSION ON COST OF EQUITY**

4 **63. Q. What is your conclusion regarding the Company's cost of common equity?**

5 A. Based upon the application of a variety of methods and models described
6 previously, it is my opinion that a reasonable rate of return on common equity is
7 10.95% for PECO, which includes recognition of the Company's strong
8 performance in the area of management performance. My cost of equity
9 recommendation is obtained from a range of results (i.e., 10.00% to 12.60%) and
10 should be considered in the context of the Company's risk characteristics, as well
11 as the general condition of the capital markets, and the strong performance of the
12 Company's management. It is essential that the Commission employ a variety of
13 techniques to measure the Company's cost of equity because of the
14 limitations/infirmities that are inherent in each method.

15 **64. Q. Does this complete your direct testimony at this time?**

16 A. Yes. However, I reserve the right to supplement my testimony, if necessary, and
17 to respond to witnesses presented by other parties.

APPENDIX A TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

Educational Background, Business Experience and Qualifications

I was awarded a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration by Drexel University in 1971. While at Drexel, I participated in the Cooperative Education Program which included employment, for one year, with American Water Works Service Company, Inc., as an internal auditor, where I was involved in the audits of several operating water companies of the American Water Works System and participated in the preparation of annual reports to regulatory agencies and assisted in other general accounting matters.

Upon graduation from Drexel University, I was employed by American Water Works Service Company, Inc., in the Eastern Regional Treasury Department where my duties included preparation of rate case exhibits for submission to regulatory agencies, as well as responsibility for various treasury functions of the thirteen New England operating subsidiaries.

In 1973, I joined the Municipal Financial Services Department of Betz Environmental Engineers, a consulting engineering firm, where I specialized in financial studies for municipal water and wastewater systems.

In 1974, I joined Associated Utility Services, Inc., now known as AUS Consultants. I held various positions with the Utility Services Group of AUS Consultants, concluding my employment there as a Senior Vice President.

In 1994, I formed P. Moul & Associates, an independent financial and regulatory consulting firm. In my capacity as Managing Consultant and for the past twenty-nine years, I have continuously studied the rate of return requirements for cost of service-regulated firms. In this regard, I have supervised the preparation of rate of return studies, which were employed, in connection with my testimony and in the past for other individuals. I have presented direct

APPENDIX A TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

testimony on the subject of fair rate of return, evaluated rate of return testimony of other witnesses, and presented rebuttal testimony.

My studies and prepared direct testimony have been presented before thirty-seven (37) federal, state and municipal regulatory commissions, consisting of: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; state public utility commissions in Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the Philadelphia Gas Commission, and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. My testimony has been offered in over 200 rate cases involving electric power, natural gas distribution and transmission, resource recovery, solid waste collection and disposal, telephone, wastewater, and water service utility companies. While my testimony has involved principally fair rate of return and financial matters, I have also testified on capital allocations, capital recovery, cash working capital, income taxes, factoring of accounts receivable, and take-or-pay expense recovery. My testimony has been offered on behalf of municipal and investor-owned public utilities and for the staff of a regulatory commission. I have also testified at an Executive Session of the State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation concerning the BPU regulation of solid waste collection and disposal.

I was a co-author of a verified statement submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission concerning the 1983 Railroad Cost of Capital (Ex Parte No. 452). I was also co-author of comments submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regarding the Generic Determination of Rate of Return on Common Equity for Public Utilities in 1985, 1986 and 1987 (Docket Nos. RM85-19-000, RM86-12-000, RM87-35-000 and RM88-25-000). Further, I have

APPENDIX A TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL R. MOUL

been the consultant to the New York Chapter of the National Association of Water Companies, which represented the water utility group in the Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Consider Financial Regulatory Policies for New York Utilities (Case 91-M-0509). I have also submitted comments to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket No. RM99-2-000) concerning Regional Transmission Organizations and on behalf of the Edison Electric Institute in its intervention in the case of Southern California Edison Company (Docket No. ER97-2355-000). Also, I was a member of the panel of participants at the Technical Conference in Docket No. PL07-2 on the Composition of Proxy Groups for Determining Gas and Oil Pipeline Return on Equity.

In late 1978, I arranged for the private placement of bonds on behalf of an investor-owned public utility. I have assisted in the preparation of a report to the Delaware Public Service Commission relative to the operations of the Lincoln and Ellendale Electric Company. I was also engaged by the Delaware P.S.C. to review and report on the proposed financing and disposition of certain assets of Sussex Shores Water Company (P.S.C. Docket Nos. 24-79 and 47-79). I was a co-author of a Report on Proposed Mandatory Solid Waste Collection Ordinance prepared for the Board of County Commissioners of Collier County, Florida.

I have been a consultant to the Bucks County Water and Sewer Authority concerning rates and charges for wholesale contract service with the City of Philadelphia. My municipal consulting experience also included an assignment for Baltimore County, Maryland, regarding the City/County Water Agreement for Metropolitan District customers (Circuit Court for Baltimore County in Case 34/153/87-CSP-2636).